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VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE, CONSERVATIVE ACCOUNTING, LIFE CYCLE 
STAGES, AND FIRM VALUATION 
 
Dr. Lodovicus Lasdi 
Unika Widya Mandala 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Using the accounting valuation model by Feltham and Ohlson (1995), this study 
examines firm valuation attributable to (1) the joint effects of accounting conservatism 
and extent of voluntary disclosures on firm valuations and (2) the joint effects of 
accounting conservatism and life-cycle stages. 
 Samples are publicly listed companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
during 2000 to 2007. Sampling was done with purposive sampling method. There are as 
many as 177 sample firms used in testing hypothesis 2, 3, 4, and 5. However, this 
research only used 74 sample firms test hypothesis 1. This is based on the fact that very 
few public companies that publish annual reports consistently in the years of 
observation of this study. Before testing hypotheses, this study conducted an effective 
model selection research first. Results show all models of hypothesis testing using a 
more efficient predictive model, which is a fixed effect model. The classical assumption 
test results also show that all models pass the test of hypothesis testing classical 
assumptions. 
 The results of this study give evidence that accounting conservatism, voluntary 
disclosure and life cycle stage affects the value relevance of accounting or non 
accounting information. The study also give evidence that market differently evaluate 
accounting information for firms in different life cycle stages and conservatism 
accounting affect the relationship between life cycle stage and company valuation. The 
study was driven from the equity valuation implications of the relationship between 
accounting conservatism and the operating assets and the relationship between 
operating assets and operating accruals in the Feltham & Ohlson model (1995). 
 
Keywords: conservatism accounting, voluntary disclosure, life cycle stages, dan market 
valuation 
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A. Introduction 
A primary objective of financial reporting is to provide relevant and reliable information to 
interested third parties (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1978). Financial reports are a 
means that manager use to communicate operating results and financial conditions of the firm 
to interested parties external to the firm. Users can then utilize this information to evaluate 
the performance and financial condition of the firm for investment decisions, fiduciary 
purposes, or other uses. There are factors are likely involved that leads market to value 
company’s financial performance. Earlier studies suggested that accounting conservatism, 
life cycle stages, and voluntary disclosure play significant role in company valuations that use 
financial accounting figures (Anthony and Ramesh, 1992; Healy et al., 1995; and Ahmed et 
al., 1999).  
Accounting conservatism represents a fundamental concept serving as a basis for 
accounting measurement and disclosure principle that limit excessive optimism in company 
performance reporting [Sterling, 1967; Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 
(SFAC 2), 1980; and Staubus, 1985]. Feltham and Ohlson (1995) (subsequently abbreviated 
as FO) proposed a theoretical valuation model suggesting that accounting conservatism 
played important role in company valuations.  
Informativeness of accounting earning has been the popular issue in research study since 
Ball and Brown (1968). The shift from industrial to the advanced technology era and to 
service-oriented economy has made the traditional analysis based on accounting earnings less 
relevant to measure the value of corporate equity (Collins et al., 1997). New assessment 
approach is needed to incorporate other accounting and non-accounting information beside 
accounting earnings to measure corporate value. FO assessment model, which include not 
only information of earnings but also of book value and voluntary disclosures, appears to be a 
promising alternative approach to corporate equity valuation. 
The current research was conducted to investigate how accounting conservatism affects 
the value relevance of accounting and non-accounting information according to the divergent 
economic attributes (firm life cycle stages) using Feltham and Ohlson’s (1995) valuation 
model. This research is motivated by the phenomenon of earlier studies which concluded that 
voluntary disclosure provides relevant valuable information not contained in the financial 
figures of the report, but in the assumption that the credibility of voluntary disclosure is the 
  
 
 
 
 
The 12th Asian Academic Accounting Association, 8 – 12 October 2011, Bali - Indonesia 3 
 
same for all firms. They concluded also that the value of information is related directly to the 
accuracy or credibility of the source. 
Conservative accounting procedures might increase the credibility of the accounting 
reports because investors tend to think that by being conservative in choosing accounting 
methods would reduce the tendency of management to be too optimistic in preparing the 
financial statements (Devine, 1963). Unlike the figures of financial statements, voluntary 
disclosures are not being audited and have no setting mechanism. The only balancer expected 
by investors that can reduce the tendency of managers’ optimistic attitude in presenting the 
voluntary disclosure is the perception that the companies are conservative in their reporting 
practices. Testing the impact of conservatism on the value relevance of voluntary disclosure 
may provide evidence of whether investors will give more credibility to the voluntary 
disclosures of companies applying conservative accounting procedures compared to those 
that are less conservative. 
Previous studies suggested also that the relevance of accounting and non-accounting 
information is influenced by the underlying economic attributes (enterprise life cycle stages). 
Black (1998) states that the different stages of the life cycle of the company led to differences 
in the characteristics it possesses, so that in calculating the corporate value the different 
stages of the life cycle must be accounted for. Value of the company consists of two 
components, namely assets in use and growth opportunities. The proportion of these two 
components may vary, depending on the company's life cycle. Furthermore, Jorion and 
Talmor (2002) states that life cycle stage is an important variable in the study of the 
relationship between accounting information and company value. In addition, the FO model 
illustrated that the growth expectation in net operating assets for companies that use 
conservative accounting would affect the company's market value.  Therefore, further 
research on the impact of conservatism on the relevance of accounting and non-accounting 
information according to stages of the life cycle of different companies is needed. 
 
B. Theoretical Review and Hypothesis Development 
Value Relevance of Accounting/Non-Accounting Information 
Since Ball and Brown (1968), many studies have examined the information content of 
accounting earnings by examining the relationship between reaction to earnings and market 
value as the change and variability in stock prices and trading volume. Most research stated 
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that accounting earning figures are relevant to the valuation of the company. However, the 
currently developed research literature, as a whole, stated that the relationship between 
market value and profits is weakening over time (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). 
After reviewing the literature returns/earnings, Lev (1989) found that accounting 
earnings account for, on average, only about 5% of the variability of  cross-sectional or time-
series stock prices, and the parameters of returns/earnings relationship are not stable 
throughout the different period of testing. Collins et al. (1997) found that, when the relevance 
of incremental value of earnings has decreased, the earning information is replaced by the 
increasing relevance of book value. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) also found that stock 
price is a function of earnings and book value, and expressed the importance of combining 
the size of earnings and book value in company valuation. Their empirical results are 
consistent with the prediction of FO theoretical model. 
These empirical results emphasize that when the accounting earnings play an 
important role in the assessment of the company, it is important to examine the accounting 
and other non-accounting information. They also provide empirical evidence for FO 
theoretical model, which states that the determinant of the company value includes 
accounting earnings, book value, and non-accounting information (e.g. choice of accounting 
methods and economic attributes of the company). This study uses FO model to investigate 
the relevance of accounting information value with different non-economic attributes of the 
company (life cycle stages). FO Model is used since it includes not only elements of profit in 
company valuation approach, but also the net book value and voluntary disclosure. 
 
Accounting Conservatism   
Although many studies have tested the effect of accruals on the profit valuation of and 
relative information content of accruals on cash flow (Wilson, 1987; Bernard and Stober, 
1989; Dechow, 1994; Warfield et al., 1995; Ryan, 1995; and Subramanyam, 1996), only a 
few examined the factors that motivate and influence the company valuation. Some 
accounting researchers have asked a question whether accounting conservatism is a useful 
convention in the objective perspective of financial reporting (Devine, 1963 and Sterling, 
1967). Empirical evidences are needed before one can determine the effect of accounting 
conservatism on corporate valuation and whether or not investors appreciate the accounting 
practices.  
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Conservative accounting practices tend to create hidden reserves and, consequently, 
generate expectations of higher future firm value in the long run. Therefore, companies that 
use conservative accounting practices are expected to be valued higher by investors compared 
to those with less conservative accounting practices. However, accounting conservatism is 
also considered as being in conflict with the principle of representational faithfulness. FASB 
put it simply in the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2: 
  
The board emphasized that any attempt to understate results is likely to raise questions 
about the reliability and integrity of information about those results and will probably be 
self-defeating in the long run. 
 
Conflict in the official announcement on the acceptance of conservative accounting practices 
has caused contention that accountants should not emphasize accounting conservatism on 
representational faithfulness because doing so may cause a biased accounting information 
and make these accounting figures less reliable for the user (Ahmed et al., 1999). The study 
attempts to show that accounting conservatism is important and feasible to ensure the 
relevance of accounting information value, especially operating assets, in the firm value 
creation. 
 
Voluntary Disclosure 
Study of voluntary disclosure is important because the accounting data disclosed in financial 
statements are outdated and frequently covers only the minimum level of disclosure required 
by the compiler and regulators of accounting standards. Voluntary disclosure can be effective 
only if the disclosure is reliable. While there are many studies that examined the information 
content of voluntary disclosures, few have examined the reliability of voluntary disclosure 
(King et al., 1990). Dechow et al. (1996) found that following the disclosure of earning 
manipulation, the company suffered from lack of analyst follower and the stock prices are 
declining. Similarly, Williams (1996) found that the sensitivity of the analyst forecast 
revision of the management forecast depends on the accuracy of management forecasting.  
Accounting conservatism tends to improve the quality of accounting information provided by 
the company; therefore it tends to also increase the reliability of voluntary disclosure 
provided that there are no other indicators for the truth of voluntary disclosure. For that 
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reason, this study expects that companies that follow accounting conservatism will increase 
their reliability of voluntary disclosure, and, as a result, they have higher share price than 
those that do not adopt conservative accounting practices. 
 
Company Life Cycle Stages 
Companies in different life cycle stages have different economic characteristics, their life 
cycle stages have been used by financial analysts and academic researchers to describe the 
economic attributes of the company. Literatures on corporate life cycle stages suggested that 
(1) company life cycle stage might explain the differences in economic conditions of the 
relevant attributes such as production function and the investment opportunity set, (2) to be 
successful, firms in different life cycle stages need to manage their business differently, and 
(3) awareness of companies about their specific life cycle stages can provide insight into 
where they has been and where they will be in the future. This insight, in turn, can help 
investors to obtain a better evaluation of the company (Lee and Nakicemovic, 1998; Anthony 
and Ramesh, 1992; and Black, 1998).  
Previous studies provide empirical evidence that accounting measures informativeness is 
different in different life cycle stages of companies. Several analytical and empirical studies 
have examined the relationship between economic attributes and the choice of accounting 
procedures. Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 1990) focused on earnings management and stated 
that the company's debt level affects the choice of accounting procedures. Skinner (1993) 
offered evidence on the relationship between the firm's investment opportunities and choices 
of accounting procedures. However, these studies found only limited evidence of a direct 
relationship between economic attributes of firms and their choice of accounting procedures 
because they claimed that the latter related directly to the level of debt and/or compensation 
contracts and that corporate economic attributes influence the choice accounting procedure 
only indirectly through the level of debt and /or contractual compensation. 
This study attempts to provide empirical evidence that the economic attributes of the 
company (life cycle stages) and the choice of accounting procedure related not only to the 
level of debt and/or compensation contract alone. This is done by examining the role of 
operating income, net operating assets, and other information on FO Model-based equity 
valuation and by investigating the implications of the life cycle stages in the company's 
market valuation. In addition, if investors considered a possible high uncertainty about future 
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cash flow of the company in the early stages of growth or decline in the final stages, the 
conservative accounting practices, assumed to reduce the subjective intervention of the 
managers to measure the accounting figures, will increase the reliability of accounting data to 
investors. 
 
Feltham-Ohlson Model 
FO model is interesting from an empirical standpoint because it gives a linear expression of 
parsimony that relates the company's market value to the observed accounting and non-
accounting information. Specifically, FO model has the interesting idea to use in empirical 
testing (Park, 2006). First, it provides a theoretical framework for the relationship between 
firm equity value, abnormal earnings and book value. This allows the current research to rely 
on theoretical models that have been built properly to avoid the use of ad hoc empirical 
models in the prediction from the direction in which the explanatory variables affect the value 
of the company. Second, FO model states that the book value of financial assets coincided 
with market value and value creation beyond the company's book value, which is largely 
generated from operating activities. It enabled the current research to eliminate the possibility 
that the aggregation of financial activities and operations weaken the influence of value-
relevant information on the value of the company. Third, these models allow the voluntary 
disclosure of information other than the accounting information that is necessary to be 
explicitly added to the model through by the term "other information."  FO Model supports 
theoretically one of the issues in this study, namely that market expectations of firm value 
depends not only on the required accounting information but also on voluntary disclosure. 
Fourth, the model explicitly incorporates conservative accounting, and enables the current 
study to measure the degree of accounting conservatism. Fifth, the model also relates the 
growth expectation with the company's market value. The model shows how the growth 
served as explanatory variable in relation to basic accounting figures according to 
conservative accounting. Unlike the Ohlson model in which growth expectations are not 
specified, the FO model provide significant relationship between corporate valuation and a 
set of investment opportunities which highlighted the creation of wealth.  
In comparison with the various ad hoc models used in the past three decades, FO models 
provide internally consistent assessment that allows the derivation of specific predictions 
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about the impact not only of the accounting information /non-accounting rules of 
measurement but also of accounting/investment opportunity set on the firm value. 
 
Effect of Accounting Conservatism and the Voluntary Disclosure on Firm Valuation 
Verrecchia (1983) states that managers, whose goal is to maximize the company's market 
value, would voluntarily distribute private information to investors when the market 
underrated the company. Healy et al. (1995) found that increases in voluntary disclosure are 
effective to lessen the underrating. However, by assuming that all voluntary disclosures are 
reliable, they do not answer the question whether the market responds differently to voluntary 
disclosures of companies with different reliability. The factors affecting the reliability of the 
company include corporate accounting policies and economic attributes. 
According to the FO model, companies that use conservative accounting tend to be 
systematically expressing lower current operating assets. In addition, accounting 
conservatism can be seen as a way for managers to assure investors about the quality of 
accounting figures reported (Ahmed et al., 1999). 
If accounting conservatism decrease the uncertainty about the distortions in the accounting 
information reported to investors, the value relevance of accounting information increase. If 
investors consider accounting conservatism as a counterweight to optimistic tendency of the 
manager in preparing not only the financial figures but also the voluntary disclosure, the 
accounting conservatism will increase the market reaction to the latter. Testing the influence 
of conservatism on the market response to non-accounting information can provide evidence 
on whether or not the investors expand the reliability resulting from accounting conservatism 
to the corporate voluntary disclosure in communicating its value to external parties.  
Hypothesis 1: Market valuation to voluntary disclosures for firms that follow 
conservative accounting practices will be higher than those that follow the 
less conservative ones.   
 
Effect of Company’s Life Cycle Stages on Firm Valuation 
Companies in different life cycle stages are generally have different economic characteristics 
and the companies in the same life cycle stages share similar economic characteristics 
(Anthony and Ramesh, 1992; and Black, 1998). Both the company's business activity and 
economic characteristics, as represented by life cycle stage, is an important explanatory 
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variable in operating results reflected in the financial statements, and the flow of future 
abnormal operating earnings which determine the firm value. 
Based on the assessment of companies that associate with the life cycle stages, this research 
hypothesized that the operating profit and net operating assets will have multiples higher 
pricing for the companies at the stage of growth than those in other life cycle stages. Based 
on the FO model, this study tested the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Investors will place a higher multiplication on abnormal operating 
earnings and operating assets for companies at growth stage than those 
in the mature and declining stage.   
 
The Effect of Accounting Conservatism and Life Cycle Stages on Firm Valuation 
Within the framework of FO assessment, growth in investment is irrelevant if and only if 
accounting is not biased. Therefore, based on conservative accounting policies applied 
consistently over time, the market value of company equity increases the expected growth in 
investment in conjunction with other value-relevant components. Conservative accounting 
implies that the company has hidden reserves for future earnings and therefore they tend to 
have high growth in net operating assets. 
Penman and Zhang (1999) shows the interaction between conservative accounting and 
investment growth. In summary, conservative accounting practices are applied consistently 
over time will reduce current profits for the company with the increase in investment. 
However, markets tend to ask for a high weighting because of income reduction due to 
increase in hidden reserves having the potential for higher future earnings than the reserve. 
On the other hand, companies that follow conservative accounting can create current profits 
by reducing investment (or growth rate in investment), which makes current profit a weak 
indicator for future earnings. To what extent is the combined effect of accounting policies 
and investment activities in hidden reserves or profits are interpreted correctly by the 
investors in the company equity pricing, expected growth in operating assets together with 
accounting conservatism provide relevant information about the company's future value 
expectations. With plenty of information in hand, including that of accounting and non-
accounting, investors have the resource to evaluate the effect of accounting conservatism on 
net operating assets, to estimate the expected growth in investment, and to measure the 
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combined effect of accounting conservatism and growth of abnormal operating earnings 
expectations for the company. Thus, this condition leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: Companies in the growth stage that follow conservative accounting 
practices have higher multiplication on operating income and/or 
abnormal operating assets than those in the same stage that followed the 
aggressive accounting practices. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Companies at the declining stage that follow conservative accounting 
practices have lower multiplication operating income and/or abnormal 
operating assets than those at the same stage that follow the aggressive 
accounting. 
 
C. Method 
Sample  
Samples are publicly listed companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the period 
2000 to 2007. Year 2000 was chosen as the baseline year because: first, from 1995 IDX has 
used automation systems of JATS (Jakarta Automatic Statistics). The companies are of 
manufacturing type. To avoid sample selection bias, this study used all categories of 
company size, from small to large scaled companies. On the other hand, to avoid survivorship 
bias, a bias due to the use of companies that are only consistent registered in the period of 
investigation, we use a sample of companies registered during the period of eight years or 
less. 
 
Data Collection 
The current study uses secondary data. Data of annual reports was obtained from the sample 
companies, the library of Jakarta Stock Exchange, and the library of  Indonesian Listed 
Companies Association. Data of financial statements and stock market were obtained from 
Jakarta Stock Exchange:  Public Companies Financial Statement at the Master Program of 
Science and Doctor of the Faculty of Economics and Business, Gadjah Mada University, the 
available JSE database on Accountancy Development Center, UGM, and at  www.jsx.co.id. 
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Model Assessment of Feltham and Ohlson (1995) to Test the Effect of Conservatism and 
Life Cycle Stages on Company Equity Assessment  
This study uses FO model to test the hypotheses related to the effect of conservatism and life 
cycle stages on the company equity assessment: 
a
itLOA  =  0 + 1 LOA
a
it 1 + 2 1itAO + 1it  (Linear Information Model) (1) 
itG  =  0  + 1 LOA
a
it + 2 itAO  + it  (Linear Valuation Model) (2) 
 
 
 
Testing the Effect of Accounting Conservatism and the Voluntary Disclosure on 
Corporate Valuation 
To test the effect of accounting conservatism and voluntary disclosure on corporate valuation 
(hypothesis H1), the research operationalize the following FO model: 
itG = kp0 + kp1 LOA
a
it + kp2 itAO + it  (3) 
where  k = c for conservative companies, and a for aggressive companies 
  p = d for expanded companies, t for unexpanded companies  
Pooled cross-sectional and time-series regression model is formulated as above for the 
intercept and coefficient to be varied for the whole range of different periods before and after 
the change in voluntary disclosure. In equation (5), kp0 , kp1 , and kp2 indicated the 
intercept, persistency coefficient, and conservatism coefficient, respectively.   
 
Testing the Effect of Life Cycle Stages on Company Valuation 
Based on indicators of life cycle stages used in Anthony and Ramesh (1992), and Black 
(1998), this study classifies the sample companies into the life cycle of growth, mature, and 
decline. The fourth hypothesis testing is done using pooled cross-sectional and time-series 
regressions with intercept and slope of the categorical variables for different life cycle stages 
with the following regression equation: 
itG  = l0 + l1 LOA
a
it + l2 itAO + it   (4) 
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where l = u for the growth companies, w for those in mature companies, and t for those in 
decline companies.  
 
Testing the Effect of Accounting Conservatism and Life Cycle Stages on Company 
Valuation 
To test the effect of conservatism and life cycles stages on market reaction to valuation 
multiple, all the companies’ years in respective life cycle stages divided into “conservative” 
and “aggresive” Strata by calculating the estimated the specific average conservatism of 
companies from the equation (1).  To test the effect of accounting conservatism and life cycle 
stages on company valuation (hypotheses H5a, H5b, and H5c), this study tested the following 
regression equation for each life cycle stage groups:  
itG  =  kl0 + kl1 LOA
a
it + kl2 itAO + it  (5) 
 
where l = u for the growth companies, w for those in mature companies, and t for those in 
decline companies.  
k   = c  for conservative and a for aggresive companies. 
 
Pooled cross-sectional and time-series regression model is formulated as above for the 
intercept and coefficient to be varied for the whole level of accounting conservatism. In 
equation (6),  l0 , l1 , and l2 (where l = u for the growth companies, w for the mature 
companies, and t for the decline companies) indicate the intercept, persistence coefficient, 
and conservatism coefficient, for conservative companies.  
 
Measuring the Conservatism 
This study tested the relative conservatism to the industrial median conservatism taken by 
investors when they make investment decisions. The estimated average firm-specific 
conservatism is compared to the median estimate of industry, calculated from equation (1) by 
using all sample firms. If the coefficient of firm-specific conservatism coefficient is greater 
than the industry median, then the sample of companies was categorized as "conservative". 
 
Voluntary Disclosure Classification 
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To investigate the effect of accounting conservatism on the association between firms’ equity 
and their voluntary disclosures, this study developed a list of voluntary disclosure items of 
Khomsiyah (2005) as a comprehensive measure of voluntary disclosure informativeness. 
Development of voluntary disclosure item list was made since the new regulations of the 
Indonesia Capital Market Regulatory Body (BAPEPAM & LK) which led to information that 
used to include components of voluntary disclosure has now become a component of 
mandatory disclosure. 
From the Khomsiyah’s (2005) list of voluntary disclosure items, the author conducted a 
voluntary disclosure rating of each company in an industry. The rating is then used to 
calculate Relative Industry Ranking (RIR) for each firm in the test period as that employed 
by Healy et al. (1995), and Lang and Lundholm (1993). RIR for company i in year t is 
defined as follows:  
Nit – Rit 
RIRit = ––––––––––––*100 (RIR) 
Nit – 1 
where Nit is the total company in the industry of company i in year t, and Rit is the score rank 
of company i disclosure in year t.  
Because the rating is calculated from a list of items representing Indonesia Financial 
Accounting Standards Board and auditors perceptions to the extent to which firms voluntarily 
disseminate information through various channels of communication rather than direct 
measures of actual disclosure, this study investigates the effect of different levels of voluntary 
disclosures during the period of testing by categorizing sample companies into two groups 
according to changes in the level of voluntary disclosure: (1) companies that significantly 
indicating a large and sustained increase, (2) companies indicating a decrease in the level of 
voluntary disclosure. To identify companies with a large, sustained increase, or decrease in 
the RIR, this study used the Changes in Relative Ranking (CRR) during the test period, as 
used by Park (2002). CRR is calculated with an average change rather than absolute changes 
to reduce measurement error: 
CRRit =
3
1



2t
tr
itRIR – 
2
1



2
1
t
tr
itRIR  (CRR) 
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In this case t is the year events when the company increase the voluntary disclosure. A 
company is classified as expanded when it has sustained a large sustained increase in its RIR 
(e.g .high CRR), or as unexpanded when it has sustained decline or unchanged in its RIR. 
 
Classification of Companies’ Life Cycle Stages 
To classify the sample companies into life cycle stages, the studi employed  four 
classification variabels frequently used in the previous researches on life cycles (Anthony and 
Ramesh, 1992; and Black, 1998): firm age (FA), percentage sales growth (PSG), capital 
expenditures divided by the total value of the company (CE), and annual dividend payments 
divided by net income (PD). FA Variables were obtained from the annual report as the 
difference between current year and the early years of establishment for each company year.  
 
SALESt – SALESt – 1 
PSGt = –––––––––––––––––––––– x 100 (PP) 
SALESt – 1 
 
CAPEXt 
CEt = –––––––––––– x 100 (PM) 
VALUEt 
 
 
DIVt 
DPt = –––––––––––– x 100 (PD) 
IBEDt 
where  
SALES  = net sales, 
CAPEX  = capital expenditure, 
VALUE = value of equity market, 
DIV  = common stock dividend, and 
IBED  = income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. 
 
D. Data Description 
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Samples are non-financial companies publicly listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
during 2000 to 2007. There are as many as 177 sample firms used in testing hypothesis 2 and 
3. Different amounts to test hypothesis 1, that is 74 sample firms. This is based on the fact 
that very few public companies that publish annual reports consistently in the years of 
observation of this study. To test the hypothesis (H1 and H3), the appropriate sample data 
qualifiers were divided into strata of Conservative and Aggressive by comparing the 
estimated average specific conservatism with the estimated industry average of equation (1). 
If the average coefficient of conservatism specific larger (smaller) than the industry average 
coefficient, the sample of firms categorized as conservative (aggressive). Description of 
samples categorized in groups of Conservative and Aggressive can be seen in table 4.1. 
 
Tabel 4.1. Classification Sample into Conservative and Aggressive 
 
Hypothesis 
Classification 
Conservative Aggressive Total 
Hypothesis 1 40 34 74 
Hypothesis 3 96 81 177 
 
In Table 4.2 can be seen the result of calcification sample of firms into groups Expanded 
disclosure (Conservative and Aggressive) and Unexpanded (Conservative and Aggressive). 
 
 
Tabel 4.2. Classification Sample into Expanded and Unexpanded (Conservative and 
Aggressive) 
 
 
 
Conservative 
Classification 
Aggressive 
 
Total 
Expanded 19 16 35 
Unexpanded 21 18 39 
Total 40 34 74 
 
From Table 4.3 shows that the sample is the largest company in the category of decline, that 
is 80 companies (46 companies as Conservative, and Aggressive as 34 companies). 
Companies in the growth stage of 60 companies, with a composition of 28 companies and 32 
Method 
Disclosure 
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companies Aggressive Conservative. Mature company as many as 37 companies with a 
composition of 22 companies and 15 companies Aggressive Conservative. 
 
E. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4.5 presents descriptive statistics of study variables for firms with disclosure expanded 
and unexpanded using accounting methods Conservative or Aggressive. Descriptive 
statistical results showed that both companies Konseratif Extended or Not Expanded shows 
the average value of equity (G) are great. This means that investors may perceive the quality 
of accounting numbers differently based on other information related to accounting 
procedures (such as conservatism). Average Abnormal Operating profit for the company's 
Conservatives, whether the disclosure of Extended or Expanded also greater than the 
aggressive company. 
 
Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics for expanded and unexpanded Company with 
Conservative or Aggressive accounting method 
Variabel N Minimum Maximum Mean Deviasi 
Standar 
Panel A: Sampel Total 
G 74 1 4.787,60 1.129,23 3.447,89 
LO 74 (18,18) 8.339,38 453,93 1.060,37 
AO 74 1,35 18.046,14 368,58 1.292,71 
Panel B: Expanded Conservative 
G 19 (11.840) 4.787,60 1.250,84 6.092,91 
LO 19 2,2 8.339,38 509,92 1.123,33 
AO 19 45,27 18.046,14 827,98 2.397,39 
Panel C: Expanded Aggressive 
G 16 (1.632) 6.319,00 425,25 1.244,13 
LO 16 (1,42) 3.418,32 191,92 472,51 
AO 16 11,01 371,26 46,66 41,28 
Panel D: Unxepanded Conservative 
G 21 (7.689) 27.028,00 509,97 3.131,49 
LO 21 (18,18) 7.746,38 924,57 1.502,74 
AO 21 52,8 4.729,31 474,19 585,32 
Panel E: Unexpanded Aggressive 
G 18 (460) 1.835,00 191,53 464,67 
LO 18 1,81 600,97 78,63 110,05 
AO 18 1,35 188,83 46,61 34,37 
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Table 4.4 presents descriptive statistics of study variables for firms with growth life cycle 
stage, Adult, and decline. Each life cycle stage is divided into the strata of Conservative and 
Aggressive. Companies on the stage of growth showed higher operating assets of all life 
cycle stages. This confirms the findings of Pashley and Philippatos (1990) that firms in the 
early stages of the life cycle, on average, investing large amounts of money in plant and 
equipment. 
 
Table 4.4. Descriptive statistics based company's life cycle with the Conservative or 
Aggressive accounting method 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
deviation 
Panel A: Sampel Total 
G 177 (11.839,71) 47.876,38 293,47 2.788,60 
LO 177 (18,18) 10.047,89 478,83 1.116,01 
AO 177 1,29 18.0461,4 3.254,03 10.534,21 
Panel B: Growth 
G 60 (4.121,25) 8.536,26 58,82 1.138,62 
LO 60 5,78 8.372,01 636,94 999,67 
AO 60 31,54 15.304,67 962,7735 1.591,624 
Panel C: Growth Conservative 
G 28 (4.121,25) 8.536,26 (5,41) 1.602,76 
LO 28 (18,18) 8.372,01 799,73 1.374,07 
AO 28 251,14 60.479,74 3.960,75 7.101,17 
Panel D: Growth Aggressive 
G 32 (1.454,89) 2.158,28 115,01 426,66 
LO 32 (4,89) 3.045,87 179,86 371,19 
AO 32 1,29 2.050,72 327,28 273,11 
Panel E: Mature 
G 37 (4.488,97) 25.421,42 301,28 2.046,39 
LO 37 (10,5) 7.746,38 449,30 1.016,61 
AO 37 4,1 47.293,06 1.880,67 3.724,33 
Panel F: Mature conservative 
G 22 (4.488,97) 9.096,09 208,42 1.553,31 
LO 22 (10,5) 7.746,38 581,78 1.229,72 
AO 22 93,52 47.293,06 2.894,39 4.556,65 
Panel G: Mature Aggressive 
G 15 (3.391,02) 25.421,42 451,40 2.614,55 
LO 15 (1,19) 3.102,34 237,17 487,88 
AO 15 4,1 1.797,85 391,89 320,38 
Panel H: Decline 
G 80 (11.839,71) 47.876,38 466,13 3.775,39 
LO 80 (4,7) 10.047,89 499,80 1.222,55 
AO 80 13,5 18.0461,4 4.815,00 14.661,01 
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Panel I: Decline Conservative 
G 46 (11.839,71) 47.876,38 682,13 4.914,05 
LO 46 (4,7) 10.047,89 777,703 1.513,71 
AO 46 54,68 18.0461,4 8.048,35 18.678,48 
Panel J: Decline Aggressive 
G 34 (1.632,16) 5.335,73 172,81 841,21 
LO 34 (1,42) 4.796,3 122,43 411,171 
AO 34 13,5 1.888,25 424,34 288,29 
 
 
F. Classic Assumption Test 
Research using the least square method approach (Ordinary Least Squares) must comply with 
the principles of classical assumptions. All the models that used in this research have 
complied the principles of classical assumptions. 
 
G. Analysis and Discussion  
Testing Effect of Accounting Conservatism and the Voluntary Disclosure On Company 
Valuation 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the market reaction to voluntary disclosures for firms that 
follow conservative accounting practices will be higher than those observing less 
conservative accounting practices. To test the hypothesis (H1), the samples were classified 
first into the expanded and unexpanded with conservative or aggressive accounting method. 
Equation (3) is subsequently tested using expanded and unchanged companies that are 
conservative or aggressive 
 The results in table 4.5 show that the influence of abnormal operating earnings (LOA) 
and operating assets (AO) on the equity value of firms is significantly positive for companies 
with conservative, expanded voluntary disclosure. Statistically significant effects were also 
shown in companies with unchanged voluntary disclosure adopting conservative accounting. 
These confirm the findings by Stober (1996) and Ahmed et al. (1999). Overall, the results 
confirm the findings of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) that the stock price is a function of 
earnings and book value, and expressed the importance of combining the size of earnings and 
book value in firm valuation. This can be seen from F-statistics of all testing models that are 
statistically significant (α = 0.05). The results provide also empirical evidence for theoretical 
models of FO, stating that the determinant of company value includes accounting earnings, 
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book value, and non-accounting information (abnormal operating earnings and operating 
assets).  
 
 
Table 4.5. Results Testing Effect of accounting conservatism and the Voluntary 
Disclosure On Valuation 
itG = kp0 + kp1 LOA
a
it + kp2 itAO + it  
Variabel Coeff. Std. 
Error 
t-stat Prob. Adj. 
R
2
 
F-stat. 
(Prob.) 
Panel A: Conservative Expanded 
 LOA 2,005 1,198 1,673 0,047 0,769 12,4865 
(0,000)  AO 0,005 0,002 2,578 0,011 
Panel B: Conservative Unexpanded 
 LOA 0,318 0,613 0,518 0.005 0, 848 5,078 
(0,000)  AO -0,257 0,218 -1,181 0.040 
Panel C: Aggressive Expanded 
 LOA 0,505 0,371 1,363 0,176 0,531 9,462 
(0,000)  AO -0,598 1,101 -0,543 0,589 
Panel D: Aggressive Unexpanded 
 LOA 0,688 0,499 1,378 0,171 0,629 4,216 
(0,000)  AO -4,044 1,483 -2,728 0,007 
 
To see the difference in market valuation between companies with Expanded voluntary 
disclosure between Conservative and Aggressive, we used Chow test of coefficient 
differences. The test results are shown in table 4.4. Chow statistics value in table 4.6., panel 
A (FStat = 17.31) greater than Ftable = 3.44, the null hypothesis is rejected and concluded 
that the regression coefficients on the company with expanded disclosure (Conservative and 
Aggressive) is different. Similarly, the coefficient difference Chow test results for companies 
with disclosure unexpanded (Conservative & Aggressive) indicates the null hypothesis is 
rejected. This means that there are different market valuation of companies unexpanded 
Conservative and Aggressive. Chow Test Value Table 4.10 panel B (FStat = 17.31) greater 
than Ftable = 3.44.  
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Table 4.6. Chow Test Results Difference Coefficient 
PANEL A: The company for Expanded, Conservative and Aggressive 
CHOW TEST FOR EXPANDED 
 
   RSSr = 2,540,000,000 
RSSur = 1,199,833,206 
n1+n2-2k = 31 
k = 2 
RSSr-RSSur = 1,340,166,794 
(RSSr-RSSur)/k:A = 670,083,397 
RSSur/(n1+n2-2k):B = 38,704,297 
A/B = 17.31 
F tabel  = 3.44 
numerator = 31 
denominator = 2 
PANEL B: The Company for Unexpanded Conservative and Aggresive 
CHOW TEST FOR UNEXPANDED 
   RSSr = 1,480,000,000 
RSSur = 943,758,198 
n1+n2-2k = 35 
k = 2 
RSSr-RSSur = 536,241,802 
(RSSr-RSSur)/k:A = 268,120,901 
RSSur/(n1+n2-2k):B = 26,964,520 
A/B = 9.94 
F tabel  = 3.45 
numerator = 35 
denominator = 2 
 
Table 4.6 implies that when investors perceive the company as conservative, they give 
greater credibility to the conservative company's accounting information than that of 
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aggressive. Investors revise previous conviction of the accounting information from 
conservative companies to a higher level than their aggressive counterparts. The results 
suggest that even if the aggressive companies expand their voluntary disclosure, they can not 
revise the confidence of investors because of the low credibility of the information. Fanani et 
al. (2009) found similar results as those in this research. They provide evidence that higher 
quality financial reporting will further increase investor confidence. One of the five variables 
that significantly affect the quality of financial reporting is accounting conservatism. These 
results support the hypothesis (H1). 
 
The Tests Results of Accounting Conservatism and Life Cycle Stages on Company 
Valuation 
To test the joint effect of conservatism and life-cycle stages on the market reaction, the 
sample of firms in each cycle is divided into conservative and aggresive strata. Subsequently, 
equation (5) is tested for all stages of life cycle. The objective is to test whether accounting 
conservatism affects the association between life cycle stages and companies valuation. The 
test results are shown in table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7. Results from Testing Effect of accounting conservatism and the of Life Cycle 
Stages to the Company Valuation 
itG  = kl0 + kl1 LO
a
it + kl2 itAO + it  
Variable Coeff. Std. 
Error 
t-stat Prob. Adj. 
R
2
 
F-stat. 
(Prob.) 
Panel A: Conservative Mature 
 LO -0,247 0,106 -2,327 0,021 0,464 305,065 
(0,000)  AO 0,008 0,001 9,196 0,000 
Panel B: Aggressive Mature 
 LO 2,573 2,425 1,061 0,292 0,293 3,687 
 (0,000)  AO -1,267 0,644 -1,967 0,041 
Panel C: Conservative Growth 
 LO 0,192 0,073 2,645 0,009 0,546 33,861  
(0,000)  AO 0,049 0,013 -3,870 0,000 
Panel D: Aggressive Growth 
 LO -0,064 0,054 -1,192 0,235 0,458 7,534  
(0,000)  AO -0,205 0,104 -1,965 0,510 
Panel E: Conservative Decline 
 LO -0,201 0,009 -21,477 0,000 0,465 34,508  
(0,000)  AO 0,001 0,000 76,304 0,000 
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Panel F: Aggressive Decline 
 LO 0,081 0,009 9,429 0,000 0,631 28,839  
(0,000)  AO -0,262 0,005 -49,635 0,000 
 
Table 4.7 shows that investors give a higher multiple on earnings abnormal and/or assets of 
the company's operations are perceived as conservative rather than aggressive company. All 
variables are abnormal operating earnings (LOA) and assets of operations (AO) from mature 
cycle stage, growth and decline for the conservatives strata statistically significant (α <0). 
Chow test results for different coefficients on stage companies Adults can be seen in table B. 
The table B panel 4.8 Value Chow statistics for the company in growth (FStat = 8.23) greater 
than Ftable = 3.44, the null hypothesis is rejected and concluded that the regression 
coefficients in the mature company of the Conservative and Aggressive is different. 
 
Table 4.8. Chow Test Results Difference Coefficient 
PANEL A: Companies in the Conservative and Aggressive Growth 
CHOW TEST for GROWTH STAGES 
   RSSr = 558,000,000 
RSSur = 233,895,655 
n1+n2-2k = 56 
k = 2 
RSSr-RSSur = 324,104,345 
(RSSr-RSSur)/k:A = 162,052,173 
RSSur/(n1+n2-2k):B = 4,176,708 
A/B = 38.80 
F tabel  = 3.45 
numerator = 56 
denominator = 2 
PANEL B: Companies in the Conservative and Aggressive Mature Stages 
CHOW TEST TAHAPAN DEWASA 
   RSSr = 1,010,000,000 
RSSur = 674,000,000 
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n1+n2-2k = 33 
k = 2 
RSSr-RSSur = 336,000,000 
(RSSr-RSSur)/k:A = 168,000,000 
RSSur/(n1+n2-2k):B = 20,424,242 
A/B = 8.23 
F tabel  = 3.44 
numerator = 33 
denominator = 2 
 
In the table 4.8 shown panels C different coefficients Chow test results for companies in the 
decline stage. Value Chow statistics for the company in growth phase in table 4.8 panel B 
(FStat = 11.44) greater than Ftable = 3.46, the null hypothesis is rejected and concluded that 
the regression coefficients in the mature company between Conservative and Aggressive is 
different. The results support the hypothesis 5a and 5b. 
The results show that investors give a higher multiple on abnormal earnings and/or 
operating assets to the companies perceived as conservative compared to those as aggressive. 
All variables of abnormal operating earnings (LOA) and operating assets (AO) of the mature, 
growth, and decline cycle stages for conservative stratum are statistically significant (α <0). 
R
2
 for mature, growth cycle stages in conservative stratum, is greater than that of sample 
companies in aggressive stratum. Exceptions to the company at the decline cycle stage having 
R
2
 conservative are smaller than that of aggressive. The results support the hypotheses 5a and 
5b. 
 
E. Conclusion, Implication, Limitation, and Suggestion 
In general, it can be concluded that accounting conservatism, voluntary disclosure and life 
cycle stage affect the value relevance and differences in value relevance of accounting/non-
accounting information. When the manager of a company undervalued by investors expand 
its voluntary disclosures to correct a low market valuation (Healy et al., 1995), the market 
reaction to voluntary disclosure is greater for companies perceived as observing the 
conservative accounting practices than their aggressive counterparts. The current study found 
also that market differently evaluate accounting information for firms in different life cycle 
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stages and that accounting conservatism affect the relationship between life cycle stages and 
company valuation. 
Investors gave higher (or lower) appreciation for the growth (or decline) companies that use 
conservative accounting practices than their less conservative counterparts. For the growth 
companies, although conservative accounting practices reduce the current earnings, the 
increase in hidden reserves resulting from accounting conservatism made the accounting 
information more informative. The results demonstrated that investor gave high multiple for 
earning decrease. For mature companies, accounting conservatism tend to not affecting the 
investors’ valuation in the form, of abnormal operating profit. On the other hand, the decline 
companies, by observing conservative accounting practices which increase current earnings, 
might be perceived as weak indicator of future earnings. Evidence suggests that the market 
provides a low weight to companies that increase their earnings temporarily. 
In addition, this study provides empirical evidence that accounting conservatism affects the 
value relevance of the difference between cash flow and operating accruals. The study was 
driven from the company equity valuation implications of the relationship between 
accounting conservatism and the operating assets and the relationship between operating 
assets and operating accruals in the FO model (1995). As more and more companies adopt 
conservative accounting practices, the market should respond more to operating accrual than 
to cash flow. 
Given the limited number samples, especially for firms with voluntary disclosure, the current 
study can not further explore the types (other than annual reports) and the level of firm 
voluntary disclosure (extended, unchanged, and reduced). Low data variability influences the 
voluntary disclosure, and accounting conservatism became weaker in some testing. 
Another factor is a proxy for the market reaction to the difference in value relevance of cash 
flow and operating accruals. In this study, market reaction is being substituted by the stock 
return in period of three months after the disclosure of annual reports. The many of inactively 
traded shares and the accuracy of the date of publication of annual reports resulted in 
difficulties in identifying promptly the market reaction to publication of the annual report. 
Subsequent research on the topic of voluntary disclosures can be conducted better when the 
data variability of voluntary disclosures is more varied. Such study will be more robust if the 
type of voluntary disclosure is not merely based on annual reports, and the level of voluntary 
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disclosure is more diverse. Non-extended voluntary disclosures can be subdivided into 
unchanged and reduced disclosures. 
This research is expected to accurately identify the publications of annual reports or other 
voluntary disclosures. Thus the research will be more robust because the stock return used 
shows the real market reaction to the publication of these voluntary disclosures. 
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